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Cosmopolitanism after Derrida: 
City, Signature and Sovereignty 
Puspa Damai 
Signatures of Cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitanism in Derrida's works sounds like an afterthought in comparison to other more recurring themes of his texts, like 
'writing', 'differance', 'supplement', 'metaphysics', or 'violence'. 
Cosmopolitanism seems to belong to deconstruction, which is often 
associated with decentring, fragmentation, and critique of totality 
and universality, only as an intimate other, a foreign element grafted 
in the body by force, or by miracle. That is the reason why, perhaps, 
hardly any cosmopolitanist refers to the issue of cosmopolitanism 
in Derrida or in deconstruction, so much so that even Derrida has 
written very sparsely on it as it belongs perhaps to the dormant, if 
not the repressed, other of deconstruction itself, and it surfaces in his 
thinking only as a surprise, an event, or a gift. 1 In this essay I argue 
that cosmopolitanism in Derrida is the signature, even the decision 
of the other as his cosmopolitics is predicated upon extending un-
conditional hospitality to the other, or upon the arrival of the 
other. Derrida, I contend, radicalises cosmopolitanism not only 
by rescuing it from both the Statist model that conceives of it as 
world government, and a utopian model that confines it to world 
citizenship, but also by critiquing and revising the traditional theo-
ontological conceptualisation of sovereignty and by supplementing it 
with a new form of decisionism, which can be called the sovereignty 
of the other. His notion of the city of refuge represents the 'other 
heading' of that sovereignty, which, in contrast to the indivisible 
nature of traditional sovereignty, is shared and divided, and in which 
it is always the other who decides without exonerating me from being 
responsible for its decision. 
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Throughout this discussion I stress the fact that cosmopolitanism 
in Derrida converges with the figure of the other itself, hence his 
simultaneous reluctance and compulsion to address and approach 
it directly. On the one hand, he resorts to several discursive detours 
in order not to compromise the 'essential' singularity, autonomy 
and sovereignty of the other, and not to 'properize' or appropriate 
the other into 'my' homolingual address, but also to put the accent 
on 'my' inherently heteronomous nature and 'my' finitude. On the 
other hand, Derrida addresses the other as if it was he who was 
being exposed to the other's address. The compulsion to invent new 
idiom to speak to and about the other, to imagine a new site and 
politics of the other is already haunted by the uncanny address from 
the other. It is this event of the other's address or apparition that 
makes deconstruction aware of its own cosmopolitan unconscious, 
which can neither be completely ignored nor fully realised and made 
present. No wonder that Derrida's writing on cosmopolitanism is at 
best preliminary, schematic, tentative, and approximative; but at the 
same time it is, like all surprises and events, intrepid, provocative, 
suggestive, and even annunciatory. It owes its provisionality partly to 
the textual genre it is destined to take. Unlike voluminous discourses 
on 'pharmakon', and 'friendship', 'psyche' and 'spectrality', the text 
on cosmopolitanism is just an address to the Parliament of Writers of 
which Derrida was a founding member and vice-president. 2 'On 
Cosmpollitanism' was published, together with 'On Forgiveness', 
another of Derrida's short addresses, in On Cosmopolitanism and 
Forgiveness (2001b) as if neither of the addresses were integer in and 
of themselves, and as if cosmopolitanism were integrally associated 
with some form of apologetics. 'On Cosmopolitanism', therefore, 
does not belong to the rest of his philosophical or theoretical writings 
in the same way as does, for instance, Margins of Philosophy (1982a). 
If this 'address' belongs, as it were to the margin of the margins, or 
to what Derrida in Dissemination (1981) calls the outwork 'that 
will not have been a book' (ibid.: 3 ), and if like all outworks that at 
once lie out of the work as well as occupy 'the entire location and 
duration of the book' (ibid.: 13 ), then this short and ubiquitous 
'address' posits formidable difficulties for reading. 3 
Since it is, as Derrida writes somewhere else, the 'ear of the 
other that signs' and 'says me to me and constitutes the autos of 
my autobiography' (1985b: 51), the text on cosmopolitanism 
could be taken as the 'signature', rather than a minor text of 
deconstruction. Therefore, taking on the formidable task of reading 
I 7 6 ~ Puspa Darnai 
it could perhaps be the right and the just way to approach Derrida 
and deconstruction. However, as in every act of signature that for 
Derrida only reveals the condition of its possibility as the condition 
of its impossibility insofar as 'a signature must have a repeatable, 
iterable, imitable form' (1982a: 328), insofar as 'the signature has to 
remain and disappear at the same time' (1984: 56), or insofar as the 
signature belongs at once to the inside as well as the outside of the 
text (1986: 4), the signature in or as cosmopolitanism is not only 
dispersed, distributed, repeated, and reiterated all over Derrida's 
works, and is given to be traced only at the moments when it emerges 
to disappear, but it also marks the border between his oeuvre and 
the world of action or praxis.4 Thus, it cannot be read simply as 
overcoming of the binaries so as to reverse the order of the centre 
and the margin, the (global) South and the North, the East and the 
West, or nationalism or national citizenship, and internationalism 
or world citizenship. Nor can it be read as an act that leaves the 
relations between the binaries perpetually undecided. The condition 
of possibility as the condition of impossibility in Derrida is what 
opens the aporetic or differential space in which nothing takes place 
but a decision, an event. Derrida's cosmopolitanism reveals, instead 
of being marred by the commonly associated vice of undecidability, 
a vigorous and enabling decisionism that helps him bring into relief 
the gap between theory and praxis. 
Seen from this perspective, Derrida's characterisation of differance, 
which for him is an assemblage of different ways, as 'neither a word 
nor a concept' (1973: 131) reveals a new meaning. By arguing that 
di ff erance is neither just a term nor a concept, he neither implies that 
it is an airy nothing nor that it is a transcendental something. Nor 
does the letter a in differance simply imply 'spacing', as 'worlding', 
spatialising and temporalising; rather it is the inflection of theory 
by praxis. If cosmopolitanism is Derrida's call for the world of the 
other, which will also be a more hospitable and just world, the aporias 
and impossibilities of theory provide opportunities and generate 
possibilities for responsible decisions. The texts that bear on the 
issue of cosmopolitanism, therefore, are all the more crucial in under-
standing the states of theory in/after Derrida. At the same time these 
texts, as reiterations of the perennial themes of deconstruction, 
help us read his earlier texts in a novel way, thereby complicating 
the easy ways of dubbing his later writings as 'deconstruction 
getting serious' as if to imply that his earlier texts were just frivolous 
theoretical mind games. 5 
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There is definitely some truth in Rorty's argument about the 
'superiority of later to earlier Derrida' (Rorty 1989: 124 ); but not 
necessarily, as he thinks, because the later Derrida creates a way 
of writing or style as opposed to the earlier one who relied solely 
on neologism or word magic. James L. Marsh reveals the reason 
behind such readings that claim the superiority of later Derrida. He 
argues that there is a strong modernist tendency in later Derrida, 
which he distinguishes from the earlier, postmodernist Derrida. 
In 'Derrida II', as he puts it, Derrida became 'much more positive 
about certain aspect of Western tradition, especially in its attention 
to universal ethical rights, to justice, and to radical social critique 
indebted to the Marxist tradition' (Marsh 1999: 22). If we agree 
with Marsh, then, Derrida's cosmopolitanism will be just another 
version of Western, liberal universalism. Are there cues in Derrida 
that indicate otherwise? Or his project, if there is one, also betrays 
the same Eurocentric tendency to 'present' itself, in the name of 
democracy, critique, human rights, justice, as a modern, advanced, 
cosmopolitan spirit? 
In reply, one can point to a number of his texts where he sounds 
quite different from what his critics make him to. In his numerous 
interviews, such as the ones compiled in Positions (1982b), Derrida 
clarifies that deconstruction traverses the interiority as well as the 
ex-teriority of Western philosophy, and he describes his method as 
a 'simultaneously faithful and violent circulation between inside 
and outside of philosophy' (ibid.: 6). To further elaborate his point, 
he argues that all the texts of Western cultures need to be read as 
kinds of symptoms 'of something that could not be presented in the 
history of philosophy, and which, moreover, is nowhere present' 
(ibid.: 7). And this search for the trace of the impresentable other 
is what informs Derrida's works on cosmopolitanism. In the very 
text in which Derrida is said to have gotten more serious, or with 
which, together with some other texts of the period, he is said to have 
entered the second phase, 'Derrida II', - 'Force of Law', Derrida 
begins by enumerating the ordeal of speaking in English and goes 
on to argue that to 'address oneself to the other in the language of 
the other' is 'the condition of all possible justice'; but at the same 
time, it is not only impossible to speak the other's language without, 
to some extent, appropriating and assimilating it to one's own, it is 
also impossible not to demote justice to (human) rights as an element 
of universality (1992a: 17). 
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To instantiate this aporia, Derrida turns to the limits of logocentric 
law that assumes that the other is capable of language, 'is capable of 
language in general, is man as a speaking animal'; and he reminds 
that not very long ago, 'man' meant 'adult white male Europeans, 
carnivorous and capable of sacrifice' (1992a: 18). While 'there are 
still, many "subjects" among mankind who are not recognised as 
subjects and who receive this animal treatment', what 'we con-
fusedly call "animal", the living thing as living and nothing else, 
is not yet the subject of the law or of law [droit]' (ibid.: 18). The 
carno-phallogocentric or anthropocentric legal paradigm, for him, 
constitutes 'the legacy we have received under the name of justice' 
which comes 'in more than one language' (ibid.: 19). The Western 
tradition or heritage, therefore, is not only multiple, like the multiple 
languages in which 'justice' has been transferred, but it also expresses 
itself as an aporia or a contradiction, which in this case, Derrida 
illustrates with the contradiction between law or right on the one 
hand, and justice on the other, one inextricably associated with the 
other, but also radically different from the other. Derridean cosmo-
politanism, thus, is not based on merely human rights or even on 
the (anthropocentric) law that has always sought to consolidate 
man's rights, or has attempted to extend conditional and calculated 
rights to certain others. Nor is it confined, as Marsh implies, just 
to Europe or to the Western tradition. Against precisely such read-
ings, Derrida calls for the invention of 'another gesture', which 
neither seeks to repeat Europe nor to entirely break away from it. 
The other gesture that he invokes rather strives to 'assign identity 
from alterity, from the other heading and the other of the heading, 
from a completely different shore' (Derrida 1992b: 30). Derrida's 
heading towards alterity, towards the other shore outside of Europe 
involves a difficult and more complicated strategy of cosmopolitics 
than the one imposed on his texts by some of his readers. Thus, it 
is imperative to cut him, as he wishes 'but in more than two places' 
(1999b: 81), and it is equally important to show the transaction or 
the trace across multiple cuts. 
Thus, by reading cosmopolitanism in Derrida as a trace that is at 
once dispersed all over his texts, yet that exceeds them all to head 
towards other shores, a trace that erases itself radically in the process of 
presenting itself, or as a signature that is at the same time in and 
out of the text, that 'remain(s) resides and falls' (1986: 5), one not 
only gains a vantage point to critique simplistic binaries of later and 
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earlier Derrida, theory and praxis, Eurocentrist and anti-Eurocentrist 
Derrida, but one also knows how to respond to charges by detractors 
who accuse Derrida of lapsing, to quote David Harvey (one of such 
detractors) 'into total political silence' (Harvey 1990: 117). This is as 
if, to take just one of many examples, Of Grammatology's rigorous 
and patient deconstruction of phonetic writing in which the West 
desires to hear itself speak, and which, coupled with anthropology, 
serves as 'the medium of the great metaphysical, scientific, technical, 
and economic adventure of the West' (Derrida 1976: 10) were not 
properly 'political'. If Harvey finds Derrida's critique of imperial 
Europe only quietly or improperly political, for Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, he is too metropolitan or cosmopolitan to be political. In her 
essay, 'Resident Alien', she hails him for his 'teleopoiesis', which she 
describes as a 'structure of touching the distant other that interrupts 
the past in the name of a future rupture that is already inscribed in 
it' {Spivak 2002: 4 7). Yet this poesis of the 'distant touching', falls 
short, for her, precisely because it still suffers from metropolitanism; 
as a result, for Spivak, Derrida's teleopoesis remains confined, as 
do all migratory models of metropolitan hospitality, to 'arrivant or 
revenant, arriving or returning' (ibid.: 47). To redress this limitation, 
she proposes to add 'the coloniser as guest' to Derrida's list of the 
guests that include 'exiles, the deported, the expelled, the rootless, 
the stateless, lawless, nomads, absolute foreigners' (ibid.: 54 ). Spivak 
finds the example of this foreigner, whom she calls the resident alien, 
in Tagore's Gora. 
What is curious here is not only how Spivak, perhaps unwittingly, 
succeeds in supplementing Derrida's cosmopolitanism by that of 
Tagore's, whose cosmopolitanism, according to Martha Nussbaum, 
succeeds in its very failure {Nussbaum 1996: 15). More curious is 
Spivak's misreading of hospitality in Derrida, which she relates to 
the arriving or returning of the immigrant in the metropolis. By pro-
posing Tagore's Gora as the coloniser-guest, she indeed reverses the 
binary of the third world immigrant as the guest, and the former 
coloniser of the first world as the host, thereby attributing the role 
of the host to the native. But by restricting hospitality in Derrida to 
the arrival or return of the metropolitan migrant, she not only over-
looks the complexity of the metropolis, to which we will return later, 
in Derrida, but she also ignores the intricacies of what Derrida calls 
the 'law of hospitality'. Isn't that sort of arrival and return what 
Derrida has always criticised as the conditional hospitality of the 
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State? Isn't that what he at all cost tries to distinguish his concept 
of hospitality from? Isn't that what he calls 'ill of all "rich", "neo-
liberal" countries' that 'welcome or allow to arrive', according to the 
needs of their economies, workers from economically less privileged 
countries, especially ex-colonies, 'a work force that they exploit 
until the day when another set of circumstances, economic, political, 
ideological, electoral, requires another calculation' (Derrida 2002b: 
140)? Doesn't he differentiate what he calls 'an ethics of hospitality 
(an ethics as hospitality) [or the unconditional hospitality] from a 
law or a politics of hospitality [conditional hospitality]' exemplified 
by the Kantian universal or cosmopolitan hospitality (Derrida 
1999a: 19-20)? Wouldn't he rather start by interrogating the very 
distinction between the Gora-guest and the native-host, not only 
because hospitality involves language, the language of the hote, hote 
as both host and guest, but also because, for him 'the implacable 
law of hospitality' is: 'the hote who receives (the host), the one who 
welcomes the invited or received hote (the guest), the welcoming 
hote who considers himself the owner of the place, is in truth a hote 
received in his own home' (ibid.: 41 ). 
Indifferent Hospitality 
It is not that by deconstructing the binary between the host and the 
guest Derrida obfuscates the colonial politics of hospitality. In fact, 
the politics of hospitality is the question - the question as to who 
gets to ask the question - in all the texts revolving around cosmo-
politanism and hospitality. Etymology and conceptual genealogy of 
hote and hosti-pet-s (the guest-master), which form the chain of 'two 
sovereign powers' of traditional law of hospitality that brings it close 
to ipseity, to one's own (Derrida 1999a: 18), and the perversion or 
even crimes of hospitality that Derrida illustrates towards the end of 
his treatise on hospitality by recounting the story of Lot in Sodom in 
which, in order to save his guests, Lot offers his two virgin daughters 
as substitutes to the people of Sodom. All of them testify to Derrida's 
stringent politicisation of hospitality, in which he critiques the father, 
familial despot, 'the master of the house who lays down the laws of 
hospitality' (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 149). 
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Thus, in spite of some reservations about Levinas's concept of 
the absolute Other, about his 'feminism' that only disguises his mas-
culinist anxieties, and his humanism that limits his concept of 
hospitality, Derrida nevertheless underscores in Levinas a certain 
feminist dimension of welcoming as he notes that Levinas defines 
the welcome, or the 'welcoming of absolute, absolutely originary, 
or even pre-originary hospitality' on the basis of femininity (Derrida 
1999a: 44).6 Contrary to what Spivak implies about Derrida's 
casting of hospitality in the 'migrationary' mode, one finds him over-
cautious about not compromising the absolute singularity of the 
newcomer. 'Pure hospitality consists in welcoming the new arrival' 
he clarifies, 'before imposing conditions on them', like asking for a 
name or identity paper; but on the other hand 'it also assumes that 
you address them, individually' for '[h]ospitality consists in doing 
everything possible to address the other' (Derrida 2005: 67). The 
absolute singularity of the hote brings in the corruptible law of hos-
pitality, and may imply that hospitality is being the master at home, 
and any encroachment 'on my "at home", on my ipseity, on my 
power of hospitality, on my sovereignty as host' would turn the 
guest into an enemy [hostis], and take me, the host, his hostage. 
Consequently classical hospitality of the sovereign host is possible 
only as finitude, that is to say, only by restricting, filtering, selecting, 
choosing, and electing the visitors or guests. Hospitality is coded 
into laws, rights, and in the name of protection, it is controlled and 
limited by the sovereign State. The conditional hospitality of the 
State is exactly what transgresses the imperative of hospitality as if 
'the laws (plural) of hospitality, in marking limits, powers, rights, 
and duties, consisted in challenging and transgressing the law of hos-
pitality', which commands unconditional hospitality to the arrivant. 
The unconditional hospitality in turn consists, he continues, in 
saying 'yes' to 'who or what turns up' before any anticipation, deter-
mination, or identification of the arrivant as a 'foreigner, an immi-
grant, an invited guest, or an unexpected visitor'; it is to accede to 
the arrival itself 'whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of 
another country, a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or 
dead thing, male or female' (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 77). 
The law of hospitality is, therefore, the law of 'autoimmunity', a 
perversion of perversion, in which hospitality transgresses its own 
laws, its own threshold; it suspends itself in order to protect itself, 
it countersigns in order to effect its signature, and it cultivates an 
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event of indetermination and indifference, a culture of, to quote his 
Politics of Friendship, 'anonymous and irreducible singularities, 
infinitely different and indifferent to particular difference' (Derrida 
1997b: 106). 
To reduce Derrida's 'in-different' hospitality to the migration 
model of 'arrival and return' is to misinterpret what he means by 
'arrivance', which, for him, is an event that renains 'to come'. The 
arrivant, who may come or never come, but with whom is inextricably 
associated the event of welcome 'must be absolutely other, an other 
that I expect not to be expecting, that I'm not waiting for, whose 
expectation is made of a nonexpectation' even beyond philosophy's 
horizon of expectation that in advance anticipates, amortises, and 
calculates knowledge (Derrida and Stiegler 2002: 13 ). To eliminate 
all references to the arrivant in the name of calculable, determinable 
and identifiable others is to renounce the incalculable in all events, 
hence to renounce justice itself. The other arrival is not predicated 
on invitation; rather it is a visitation that exceeds the economy of 
expectation, and surpasses the ceremonies of reception. The hote 
visits as if it were a surprise, and one receives him without being 
ready to welcome him, not in one's name or identity, or at least 
without resorting to the principle of sovereign hospitality; rather 
one receives as if the guest were the master of the house. Hospitality 
par excellence is the one 'in which the visitor radically overwhelms 
the self of the visited, and the chez-soi of the hate [host]' (Derrida 
2002a: 372). 
The welcome of unconditional hospitality is, thus, heteronomous 
even to the binary of the host and the guest, to ontology itself. Derrida 
clarifies it further in Aporias by arguing that the arrivants (plural) 
need to be distinguished from 'the absolute arrivant, who is not even 
a guest, and with his arrival he surprises the host, who is not yet a 
host or an inviting power' (1993: 34). Insofar as the arrivant does 
not yet have a determined identity, it can neither be an occupier nor 
a migrant. 'The absolute arrivant as such', he continues, 'is not an 
intruder, an invader, or a colonizer because invasion presupposes 
some self-identity for the aggressor and the victim' (ibid.). That 
does not mean, however, that hospitality must remain merely an 
abstract and spectral notion. It must develop into a culture. No 
hospitality, Derrida reminds in Acts of Religion, is without a culture 
of hospitality, for hospitality is culture itself; therefore, hospitality 
should 'multiply the signs of anticipation, construct and institute 
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what one calls structures of welcoming [les structures de. l'accueil], a 
welcoming apparatus [les structures d'acceuifj' (Derrida 2002a: 361). 
These indifferent apparatuses or institutes of welcome that are also 
cognisant of infinite difference are called in 'On Cosmopolitanism' -
'the cities of refuge'. 
Before we go on to dwell on the 'cities of refuge', what is impor-
tant to note here is not just the inadequacy of approaches to Derrida 
that seek to divide his texts into later and earlier Derrida, or more or 
less political Derrida, Marxist or anti-Marxist, modernist or post-
modernist, and Eurocentric or anti-Eurocentric Derrida. Cer-
tain Marxist and postcolonial theories, as we have seen, misread 
Derrida's cosmopolitical thinking precisely because it attempts to 
invent the other (of) politics, and imagine the other (of) Europe. 
Rather, we also need to note Derrida's own unwillingness to directly 
address cosmopolitanism, as if that would be tantamount to taking 
it as something that already exists, thus, to accede to what passes 
for cosmopolitanism, namely, to quote Walter Mignolo's terms, im-
perialism, Christianity, neo-liberal globalisation, and emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism of Vitoria, Kant, or Karl Marx (Mignolo 2002: 158). 
As Derrida reveals in his contribution to Autodafe, the journal of 
the International Parliament of Writers, 'a cosmopolitanism ordered 
by the traditional concept' of 'citizen of the State and the nation' 
is not sufficient at all to 'prepare new concept and new strategies 
for an international resistance' (2001a: 65). In other words, cosmo-
politanism needs to be re-thought away from its trad-itional concept 
as world citizenship or world government, which dominates even 
very perspicacious critique of cosmopolitanism like Craig Calhoun's 
(to cite just one of numerous examples), which demystifies certain 
cosmopolitanism of the frequently travelling class. Yet, by subscribing 
to Charles Taylor's notion of 'cohesive and self-governing societies', 
it reverts to 'active [world] citizenship' for social solidarity (Calhoun 
2002: 96). In their essay, 'Four Cosmopolitan Moments', Robert 
Fine and Robin Cohen (2002) identify in Zeno, Kant, Arendt and 
Nussbaum four major moments of cosmopolitanism: cosmopolitanism 
'as a placeless meeting of minds, cosmopolitanism as perpetual peace, 
cosmopolitanism as justice, [and] cosmopolitanism as an answer to 
social fragmentation, extreme nationalism or ethnic hostility' (Fine 
and Cohen 2002: 162). Even in this fourfold approach Derrida would 
find varying degree of Statism or anti-Statism, from which he would 
detour towards a deconstructive or differential relation with the State. 
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He would even distance his position from isolating four individual 
moments as cosmopolitanism as for him cosmopolitanism seldom 
remains a subject to direct address. 
Detours of Cosmopolitanism 
At the same time, all Derrida's detours into cities, hospitality, into the 
critique of home and ontology, that is to say, the critique of 'one's 
own', and of the host-guest binary, and his foregrounding of the 
arrivance, are detours from only one point: the State, which, with its 
principle of indivisible sovereignty grounded in its theo-ontological 
foundations, its calculative and selective hospitality, and its legal 
paradigms that operate to uphold citizenship, rights, and the rule of 
law - all almost invariably exclusionary mechanisms - attempts 
to freeze all detours, thus reflection and theory, into one moment of 
presence or univocal political decision. Moreover, detours are not 
simply sites where Derrida indulges in his notorious play of language; 
rather, as he suggests in 'Des Tours de Babel', all detours are also 
strategic twists and turns, translations and transferences, or they 
are politics of speaking or listening to others, other languages; and 
above all, they represent sites for 'raising a tower, [or] constructing a 
city' (Derrida 2002a: 307). Detours of cosmopolitanism in Derrida 
are detours from the State to the city, from the indivisible and ex-
ceptionalist principles of sovereignty to the differential and dispersed 
moments of signature. 
In Politics of Friendship (Derrida 1997b), he takes this detour 
in order to critique the construction of the political in Western 
philosophy around the terms 'the friend and the enemy'. He starts 
by quoting Montaigne quoting Aristotle: 'O my friends, there is 
no friend'; which for him 'displays the heritage of an immense 
rumour throughout an imposing corpus of Western philosophical 
literature: Aristotle to Kant, then to Blanchot; but also from 
Montaigne to Nietzsche', who parodies the quotation by reversing 
it into: 'O enemies, there is no enemy' (ibid.: 27). Derrida relates 
this dictum of the end of the enemy to the post-cold war rhetoric of 
the end of history, which, on the one hand, announces the victory 
of 'parliamentary democracies of the capitalist Western world' 
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that now find themselves 'without a principal enemy'; on the other 
hand, this destructuration would give way to 'new reconstitutive 
enmities' that would 'multiply "little wars" between nation-states', 
and would seek to identify enemies like China and Islam (Derrida 
1997b: 77). By relating this desperate search for an identifiable 
enemy to Carl Schmitt's notion of the declaration of the enemy 
as the foundation of the political, Derrida argues that a spectre of 
the enemy haunts Western political philosophy that is destined to 
reproduce and multiply the spectre, for the enemy's disappearance 
is made intimate to its own disappearance. The end of the enemy 
therefore is 'a crime against the political itself, and the retribution 
against this crime is 'unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing 
neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its 
unprecedented - therefore monstrous - forms' (ibid.: 83). The 
reinvention of the enemy that not only eludes but also threatens, 
due to its public nature, to change place with the friend itself, and 
the subsequent inflicting of monstrous violence upon it is the only 
way to repoliticise the political. Against this tradition that cannot 
be 'thought without knowing what "enemy" nleans, nor a decision 
made without knowing who the enemy is' (ibid.: 106), against the 
Schmittian decisionism, which is not only nothing more than 'a 
theory of the enemy', (ibid.: 67), but also a theory of the sovereign 
subject that is free and willful, to whom nothing happens, not even 
the event, Derrida calls for a 'passive' decision without freedom that 
'signifies in me the other who decides and rends' (ibid.: 68), or to be 
more precise, that bears the 'signature of the other' on me (ibid.: 32). 
The un-homely moment of the signature is not the disruption of 
home by the anonymous world, but by the absolute and singular 
other that however arrives to trouble identification itself, by the one 
that is the arrivant itself. Allowing the other to come by withdrawing 
oneself produces an event in which one sinks 'into the darkness of 
a friendship which is not yet' (ibid.: 43). One cannot be it, be there 
yet, or have it, but one must be its friend, and, for Derrida, this 
solitary friend of the other not only 'overpoliticises the space of the 
city' (ibid.: 43 ), but he also initiates democracy to come. 
It is the figure of Theuth, the god of writing, who, Derrida says, 
is hardly a character in Plato's Phaedrus or Philebus, but who bears 
strong resemblance to other gods of writing, especially to Thoth, 
the Egyptian god of writing, that plays the role of the friend in 
Dissemination. Derrida argues that Plato's visit to the Egyptian 
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god is 'neither a partial or total borrowing, nor of chance or Plato's 
imagination', rather it reveals a structural necessity, which makes 
the Western logos and its philosophemes unthinkable without the 
incursion of the 'foreign' mythos. In Phaedrus, Plato presents Thoth 
as 'a subordinate character, a second, a technocrat, without power of 
decision', as he is just an engineer or clever servant admitted to the 
King's Counsel merely as a techne or a pharmakon (Derrida 1981: 86). 
But a second look at the figure of the god of writing or pharmakon 
in Egyptian mythology will reveal that Thoth is the pharaoh's top 
vazir or functionary, and the gods' secretary; and he is also the 
son of the Sun king. Thoth, as a divine scribe, therefore, is the 
master of the books, or the keeper of accounts; therefore he is 
also called the ~Master of divine words' (ibid.: 91). As he also presides 
over the organisation of death and he counts the weight of the dead 
souls and enumerates the days of life, thus history, he is as well called the 
strongest of the gods (ibid.: 92). The figure that Plato considered 
contagious and poisonous, a pharmakon because he dulls memory, 
turns out to be the scribe of time and history. In fact, Plato, who tries 
to comprehend, thereby dominating the god of writing on the basis of 
oppositions (good/evil, true/false, essence/appearance, inside/outside), 
tries to make each of the terms in the opposition external to the other, 
whereas in fact, it is writing as pharmakon that opens the possibility 
of opposition as such without letting itself be comprehended by it. 
Derrida argues that it is the pharmakon that brings the opposition 
of the inside and the outside into effect; and, the ref ore, cannot itself 
be assigned a site that it situates. It cannot be subsumed under con-
cepts that it draws, it 'leaves only its ghosts to a logic that can only 
seek to govern it insofar as the logic arises from it'; one would then 
have to bend, Derrida concludes, 'into strange contortions what could 
no longer even simply be called logic or discourse' (ibid.: 103 ). 
Even though Thoth, for Derrida, is the figure of dissemination 
that ghosts the binary of inside and outside in which Plato tries to 
apprehend him, cosmopolitanism is still foreign to the idiom that he 
deploys to ransack Plato's pharmacy. Same is the case in Specters of 
Marx, which intensifies Derrida's critique of all 'Platonic' attempts 
to salvage binaries by, as he says in Dissemination, leaving 'the ghost 
behind' (1981: 104). Yet, in this text too, cosmopolitanism never 
makes an appearance. Instead he depicts a world that is steadily 
wearing and tearing, a world festered with ten plagues he counts 
on its wounded body, a becoming worldwide of the world he calls 
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'mondialisation' in which '[e]ntire regiments of ghosts have returned' 
from the 'economic wars, national wars, wars among minorities, the 
unleashing of racisms and xenophobias, ethnic conflicts, conflicts of 
culture and religion that are tearing apart so-called democratic Europe 
and the world today' (Derrida1994: 80). In order to justly respond 
to these ghosts, he proposes not only an alliance with a certain spirit 
of Marxism, but also a radicalisation of Marxist critique. Moreover, 
he puts forward a project of a 'New Internationalism' that seeks to 
profoundly transform international law beyond the sovereignty of 
the States by including 'the worldwide economic and social field' 
(ibid.: 84). Derrida clarifies that the invocation of the worldwide 
is neither an anti-Statist argument nor a simple affirmation of the 
withering away of the State. His 'New International' that denounces 
the de facto take over of international authorities, like United 
Nations, by powerful nation-states, the hypocrisy of human rights, 
the states of foreign debts, and the monstrous techno-military 
inequality, is 'a link of affinity, suffering, and hope', which is also an 
untimely link, 'without status, without title, and without name' (ibid.: 
85). It must remain for him a link that is without country, without 
party, without contract, 'without national community, (International 
before, across, and beyond any national determination), without 
cocitizenship, without common belonging to a class' (ibid.). Thus, 
by articulating an International faithful to the Marxist tradition, 
but without a national community, or a party, or State citizenship, 
Derrida not only seeks to dehinge Marxism's ontological bind with 
the ghosts, 'with materialism, the party, the State, the becoming-
totalitarian of the State', but by underscoring a 'certain emancipatory 
and messianic affirmation, a certain experience of the promise' 
(ibid.: 89), he also seems to invoke cosmopolitanism that involves 
the messianic arrival of the other. 
Some detractors may wish to ignore Derrida's highly philosophical 
moves towards deconstructing ontology, messianism and the laws 
of hospitality, and ask rather bluntly how notions of friendship, 
pharmakon, dissemination or the New International (all derived 
from Derrida's reading of the canonical European texts, whether 
by Plato, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Freud or even Schmitt) relate to 
cosmopolitanism. They may argue that, in spite of its radical edge, 
Derrida's cosmopolitanism is one from above, in contrast to the 
one from below, which Pheng Cheah locates in the works of writers 
like Kwame Anthony Appiah, Bonnie Honig, Bruce Robbins, Scott 
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Malcomson, and Amanda Anderson (Cheah 1998: 21). There are a 
number of ways one can respond to these objections: one of them would 
be to bring into play Derrida's notion of 'elsewhere', or 'to come' that 
resists the dichotomy of the above and the below, without, however, 
failing to evoke a constituency that strongly resembles the 'below'. 
In 'Taking a Stand for Algeria', his address to a public meeting 
organised by the International Committee in support of Algerian 
Intellectuals (ICSAI) and the League of Human Rights in 1994, 
Derrida talks about 'elsewhere' by which he means not only taking 
a stand for Algeria internationally, but also what he calls in the 
address, the 'Third Estate' that lies below the State politics. The time 
for democracy in Algeria, he writes, 'will be long, discontinuous, dif-
ficult to gather into the act of one single decision'; such a decision 
that should take more time may not 'even be able to gather in Algeria. 
Things will have to take place elsewhere too' (Derrida 2002a: 302). 
In a way, the other has to make decisions for democracy in Algeria, 
of course not to allow a 'right of intervention or of intrusion, granted 
to other states or to the citizens of other states' but to 'reaffirm the 
international aspect of the stakes and of certain solidarities that tie us 
all the more in that they do not only tie us as the citizen of determinate 
nation-states' (ibid.: 304). Derrida invokes this other, international 
solidarity, for he is aware of the limits of the rhetoric that chants: 
non-intervention and respect for self-determination, but not with-
out running the risk of being 'at best the rhetorical concession of a 
bad conscience, at worst, an alibi' (ibid.). The 'future [l'avenir] of 
Algerian men and women of course belongs in the end to the Algerian 
people', he writes, but the Algerian future to come arrives neither 
from somewhere up high, nor from below, but from elsewhere - the 
Third Estate, which says 'no to death, to torture, to execution, to 
murder' (ibid.: 307). The only hope of democracy to come is carried 
by this Third Estate that in his or her country has 'no right to speak, 
is killed or risks his or her life because he or SHE speaks freely, he 
or SHE thinks freely, he or SHE associates freely' (ibid.). 
Again the 'elsewhere' of the democracy to come is emphasised 
in 'Racism's Last Word' (1985a), Derrida's contribution to the 
catalogue of the Art exhibition against apartheid organised in Paris 
in 1983 by the Association of Artists of the World against apartheid. 
In this essay, Derrida likens apartheid's system of partition and 
barbed wire to a concentration camp and argues that apartheid re-
mains - as unique manifestation of the lowest extreme of racism - a 
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'Western thing' (1985a: 293 ). This resolutely Western state-racism, 
however, demands or engenders worldwide response in the form of 
an 'untimely' and 'exilic' art exhibition by the artist. 'Artists from all 
over the world', he notes, 'are preparing to launch a new satellite, 
a vehicle whose dimensions can hardly be determined except as a 
satellite of humanity' (Derrida 1985a: 293 ). The satellite humanity 
is untimely and exilic in the sense that it yet does not have a fixed 
place, it does not yet take place, because its destination remains to 
come, 'which is South Africa beyond apartheid, South Africa in 
memory of apartheid' (ibid.). This does not at all compromise the 
importance of exhibition as the satellite of humanity, which is at 
once a 'mobile and stable habitat', and like all satellites, it guards, 
'it keeps watch and gives warning: Do not forget apartheid, save 
humanity from this evil, an evil that cannot be summoned up in the 
principal and abstract inequality of a system' (ibid.). There would 
be no elsewhere to apartheid without the circumambulatory satellite 
of humanity, no democracy to come without certain levitating to 
some height that keeps watch and issues warning against forgetting 
the evil. But Derrida also distinguishes the satellite humanity from 
European 'reasons of the states' that keep on turning Africa into 'a 
giant tableau or painting, the screen for some geopolitical computer' 
upon which European states project the bottom lines of the profits 
and losses, yet pretend to denounce apartheid 'from the heights of 
international platforms' (ibid.: 298). Against the 'dialectics of de-
negation', the exhibition, for Derrida, 'signs with a single stroke' and 
appeals 'unconditionally to the future of another law another force 
lying beyond the totality of this present' (ibid.). 
In 'Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration', Derrida 
speaks of another height and another superiority. He talks about 
Mandela's 'My people and I', which Mandela uses 'without talking 
like a king' (Derrida 1987: 13) or of Mandela's autobiographical 'I' 
that 'reasons and signs in the name of "we" (ibid.: 26), and also of 
the force of admiration that affects both his admirers and enemies, 
even though the latter do not easily admit it. The force of admiration 
of Mandela, according to Derrida, comes not only from Mandela's 
admiration for, and reflection on, the Law, but also the 'law itself, 
the law above other laws' (ibid.: 15). It is this law superior to the law 
of the White man, who does not respect his own law in South Africa, 
that lies behind Mandela's defiance of the White supremacist law, 
and that is also the law before which he wishes to appear. Mandela's 
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evocation of the superior law is not mere reflection of what is called 
the Western legal deontology of the Magna Charta. Derrida plays 
on the notion of reflection, correspondence and inheritance and 
argues that Mandela reflects on, corresponds to, and inherits Western 
laws, which the White ruling minority of South Africa fails to do. 
But Mandela's reflection also responds to another height, another 
superiority and legacy, that of the structure and organisation of early 
African societies, that prefigure and 'make visible ahead of time, 
what still remains invisible in its historical phenomenon, that is to 
say, the "classless" society -and the end of the exploitation of man 
by man' (Derrida 1987: 25). Thus, Derrida's reading of Mandela's 
The Struggle is My Life does not limit itself to reading Mandela as a 
'simpler inheritor' (ibid.: 17) of the Western juridical tradition, nor 
does it confine itself to portraying him as someone who mastered 
the Western legal tradition in order to turn it against the masters 
themselves. By recognising in him a recognition of the superior 
law above all laws, the law before the arrival of the White man, 
Derrida identifies in him an 'authentic' inheritor, 'who conserves 
and reproduces', but at the same time, 'who respects the logic of the 
legacy enough to turn it upon occasion against those who claim to 
be its guardians, enough to reveal, despite and against the usurpers, 
what has never yet been seen in the inheritance' (ibid.). 
Cities of Refuge 
No legacy, nor any inheritance, it seems, is without doing some 
violence to the heritage one inherits; in the same way, there is no 
hospitality without first stepping out of one's house to meet the 
hate on the threshold. It is precisely at this threshold between one's 
own and the other, or at the border between the above and the 
below, and at the limit between the two laws of hospitality - the 
conditional and the unconditional - that Derrida situates, what 
he in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (2001b) would call, 
'the cities of refuge'. The cities of refuge or asylum, which materially 
manifest, what Derrida terms in Acts of Religion (2002a), the 
'structures of welcome', are placed at the border he shores up from 
the distinction between two forms of the metropolis: the City and 
the State. The notion of the 'polis' needs to be ruptured into the 
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City and the State because for him the State including the non-State 
organisations, which are non-State in appellation only as they are often 
controlled by the powerful states, are the signatories of violence on a 
worldwide scale. Whenever the State is not the foremost author -
it is also not the foremost guarantor against the violence that forces 
refugees or exiles to flee - Derrida writes, 'it is often powerless 
to ensure the protection and the liberty of its own citizens before 
a terrorist menace' (2001 b: 6). He recalls Hannah Arendt's 'The 
Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man' to 
argue that while between the two world wars the borders of the states 
are flooded with refugees and exiles, the homeless and the stateless 
[ Heimatlosen ], the right to asylum undergoes a progressive abolition; 
it is 'felt to be an anachronism and a principle incompatible with 
the international law of the State' (ibid.: 7). Whenever the European 
nation-states have bothered to think about the rights of asylum, they 
have done so by referring to it as 'the control of immigration', thereby 
conflating refugee status with the status of the immigrants. On the one 
hand, by conflating refugee and immigrant statuses, the State brings 
the rights to asylum back into its demographic-economic interests 
or into the rhetoric of its electoral programmes. On the other hand, 
by restricting the international law to the treaties between sovereign 
states, the State has a sovereign monopoly over asylum seekers. As 
a result, the asylum seekers are left to the indiscretion of the border 
police, or what Derrida echoing Walter Benjamin calls, 'a police 
without borders' (ibid.: 14). 
This formless and faceless menace of the police without borders, 
aided by new technology, is nowhere more pervasive than in the 
so-called civilised states, where, the police, omnipresent and spec-
tral, 'undertake to make the law, instead of simply contenting 
themselves with applying it' (Derrida 2001b: 14). It is imperative 
now to distinguish the 'border' cities, the cities of refuge, from this 
borderless spectrality of the police, already a formidable form of 
cosmopolitanism that has monopolised powers of legislation and 
decision over what or who arrives at its border without a border. 
Thus, for Derrida, cosmopolitanism is always one form of cosmo-
politanism against the other, one form of spectrality against the 
other, one form of sovereignty against the other, or one form of 
the polis (City) against the other (State), hence the importance of 
inheritance and decision. 'If we look to the city, rather than the 
state', he clarifies, 'it is because we have given up hope that the state 
192 ~ Puspa Damai 
might create a new image for the city' (ibid.: 6). Creating the new 
image of the city is not only reaffirming rights to asylum and the laws 
of hospitality, but to even go beyond rights, deontology, and con-
ditional laws of hospitality to 'open up new horizons of possibility 
previously undreamt of by international state law' (Derrida 2001 b: 8). 
He therefore calls upon the Parliament of Writers not to hesitate to 
declare their ambition: 
For let us not hesitate to declare our ultimate ambition, what gives 
meaning to our project: our plea is for what we have decided to call 
the 'city of refuge'. This is not to suggest that we ought to restore 
an essentially classical concept of the city by giving it new attributes 
and powers; neither would it be simply a matter of endowing the old 
subject we call the 'city' with new predicates. No, we are dreaming 
of another concept, of another set of rights for the city, of another 
politics of the city (ibid.). 
Another politics of the city or in Derrida's word, 'cosmopolitics' 
does not imply the return to traditional concept of the city, rather it 
suggests a rigorous depoliticisation in which the city has to 'elevate 
itself above the nation-state' (2001b: 9). But elevating au-dessus 
des Etats-nations does not mean that the city of refuge becomes the 
legendary tower of Bable that attempts to touch the sky. The elevation 
or superiority of the city of refuge is its exceptionality as a space 
of immunity and exemption, so far enjoyed only by kings and their 
palaces, lords and their castles, and the priests and their churches. 
Therefore, by referring to urban immunity and exemption, for 
instance to the Book of Numbers where God ordered Moses to build 
six cities of refuge, to Levinas's exegesis of 'Les villes refuges' in his 
meditation on the Verses, and to the medieval tradition of sanctuary 
provided by the church, or auctoritas that allowed kings or nobles 
to shield their guests from pursuits, Derrida does not simply repeat 
or return to the historical and mythical accounts of such spaces. 
Rather, he is interrogating the sovereign monopoly on exception and 
immunity, and supplementing it with new, less theo-ontological and 
more reflective and divisive forms of sovereignty. He also critically 
examines these traditions for the limits and conditions they impose 
on the 'superiority' of the city. For instance, he acknowledges that 
the Enlightenment figures, especially Kant, inherit cosmopolitan 
tradition of Greek stoicism and Pauline Christianity, but he finds 
Kant's cosmopolitanism - in spite of the premium it puts on the law 
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of universal hospitality without limit, or on hospitality as a natural 
law, thus inalienable and imprescriptible-compromised by a con-
ditioning logic of hospitality. On the one hand, Kant, for Derrida, 
thinks that all human creatures have received in equal proportion 
common possession of the surface of the earth; as a result no one 
can legitimately appropriate the surface area for himself or withhold 
access to another man. On the other hand, Kant painstakingly spe-
cifies that the common place covers the surf ace of the earth, that is 
the case, argues Derrida, not so much to exclude any point of the 
world or the finite globe (globalisation), but 'to expel from it what 
is erected, constructed, or what sets itself up above the soil: habitat, 
culture, institution, State, etc.' (2001b: 21).7 By keeping what is 
elevated above the surface as the space of exception, which is founded 
on the earth, but not unconditionally accessible, precisely due to its 
elevation and edification, to all arrivants, Kant succeeds in imposing, 
according to Derrida, two limits on his otherwise universal law of 
hospitality: the newcomer has the right of visitation rather than the 
right of residence; and for Kant hospitality should remain a law to 
be decided upon by the State police. 
In contrast to Kantian hospitality that seeks to divide hospitality 
of the surface of the earth from which men 'cannot scatter themselves 
infinitely' (Kant 1983: 118) and the hospitality of what is above the 
earth, thus the capital or sovereign hospitality, hospitality of the 
State, of the capital city and its commerce and culture, from which 
Kant never rules out the possibility of infinite dispersion, exclusion, 
banishment, and expulsion, Derrida proposes the elevated city of 
refuge, which is a sovereign space, but unlike the State, it is left open 
for the other to arrive without any condition. It is this 'free city' 
constructed, but not in order to monumentalise the construction; 
elevated, but not as a sovereign head of the State; rather a city, 
which is based on the axiome d'incompletude, that, in his view, 
should 'reorient the politics of the state' (Derrida 2001b:4 ). What is im-
portant to note here is that Derrida does not say the new politics 
of the city dismantles the State, or makes it wither away. Nor does 
he say, as Foucault does, for example in Society Must be Defended, 
that 'we have to bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty' 
(Foucault 2003: 27). Cosmopolitics of the city of refuge reorients 
the politics of the State insofar as the unconditional hospitality that 
the city offers to the arrivant cannot be written into any law of any 
State; the unconditional hospitality thus remains above all states, 
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their appropriation and domestication; therefore it is cosmopolitan. 
At the same time, however, cosmopolitics seeks to tr an sf orm and 
improve the existing law. The perfectability or deconstructibility 
of all State laws implies the possibility of the other of the laws, or 
justice in the same way as the city of refuge lies on the other side of 
the State - connected, but asymmetrical: 
It is a question of knowing how to transform and improve the law, and 
of knowing if this improvement is possible within an historical space 
which takes place between the law of an unconditional hospitality, 
offered a priori to every other, to all new comers, wherever they may 
be, and the conditional laws of a right to hospitality, without which 
The unconditional Law of hospitality would be in danger of remaining 
a pious and irresponsible desire, without form and without potency, 
and of being perverted at any moment (Derrida 2001b: 22-23). 
The city of refuge at once embodies in a quasi-normative fashion 
the unconditional law of hospitality and the perfectability of the 
conditional laws and rights of hospitality. It calls for a work of 
juridical transformation and calculation without becoming the Work 
of a sovereign head, or ontology. Through law, but also beyond 
law, it makes cosmopolitics, like justice, an impossible experience 
that cannot wait, or an urgency that calls for 'a just response, more 
just in any case than the existing law' (ibid.: 23). Cosmopolitanism 
after Derrida is an immediate response to crime, violence and 
persecution; and the city of refuge for him is the place of reflection 
in which 'a new order of law, and a democracy to come' is put to 
the experiment (ibid.). If Derrida's conclusion in the address 
invokes a 'cosmopolitanism to come' that is not because it lies in an 
uncertain future, but because the cosmopolitanism of the other is as 
asymmetrical to the time of our living present as are cities of refuge 
to a 'globalatinised' world. 
Notes 
1. There is a glaring absence of reference to Derrida's cosmopolitanism 
in major texts on the subject published around or after the publication 
of Derrida's texts on cosmopolitanism. Neither Conceiving Cosmo-
politanism eidted by Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (2002) nor 
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Debating Cosmopolitics (Archibugi et al. 2003 ), to give just a few 
examples, mention Derrida's texts on cosmopolitanism. One also looks 
in vain for any references to Derrida's concept of cosmopolitanism in 
Breckenridge et al's Cosmopolitanism (2002). 
2. As Christian Salmon, in the first issue of the Parliament of Writer's 
Journal, Autodafe, informs us, the Parliament convened in haste after the 
assassination of Tabar Djaout in Algeria in 1993, and Salman Rushdie 
and Wole Soyinka were its first two presidents. And from the moment of 
its creation, it has been involved in setting up network of Asylum Cities 
that offer refuge to writers and artists threatened by fundamentalist and 
totalitarian regimes. 'Five years after its creation', Salmon continues, 
'there are thirty cities in this network' that include cities like Barcelona, 
Frankfurt, Salzburg, and Venice (2001: 13 ). 
3. There is at least one more text by Derrida, 'Globalization, Peace, and 
Cosmopolitanism' (see 2002b), that directly bears cosmopolitanism in its 
title, and no surprise that this text is also his address to UNESCO. Yet, 
in this too, cosmopolitanism has been, as if by some internal constraints 
of the concept itself, addressed in the company of other associated 
concepts. It is addressed as one concept among others, as an other 
concept, as the concept of the other, or as the other's concept as if to 
imply that one cannot address cosmopolitanism directly, as if, to quote 
from the introduction of the collection of essays on the subject, 'specifying 
cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an uncosmopolitan thing to 
do' (Breckenridge et al. 2002: 1 ). 
4. It is significant therefore that Derrida's essay, 'On Cosmopolitanism' 
appeared in Routledge's series called 'Thinking in Action' (see Derrida 
2001b). Recalling this fact is not a lapse into the binary between thinking 
and action, but it is an act of underscoring the indissociability of theory 
and praxis in Derrida not only in the sense of a certain performative aspect 
of his texts, but in the sense of their evocation of the signature, event or 
agency which reside precisely at the borders of theory and praxis. 
5. Even very insightful readings of Derrida's texts like John McCormick's 
'Derrida on Law; or Poststructuralism gets Serious' (2001) are hostage 
to this hostility towards the early, more playful Derrida. That does not, 
however, mean that they approve of late style or 'more serious' Derrida. 
McCormick quickly adds to qualify his observation about seriousness 
in the title by arguing that 'Force of Law' reveals the decisionism and 
its bleak association with Heidegger and Carl Schmitt that Derrida 
harboured for decades (ibid.: 396). 
6. Derrida's reservations about Levinas's philosophy in general, and his 
notions of hospitality, femininity and alterity in particular can be found in 
texts like Writing and Difference (1978), especially in the essay 'Violence 
and Metaphysics', in which Derrida not only detects in Levinas's thinking 
a necessity of 'lodging oneself within traditional conceptuality in order 
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to destroy it' (ibid.: 111), but also articulates a problem in Levinas's 
envisioning of positive infinity in the name of infinite alterity, which, for 
Derrida, is possible only when one renounces all languages (1978: 114), 
thus all differences or exteriority itself. These reservations become more 
incisive in a very illuminating and 'dialogic' essay 'At this Very Moment in 
This Work I Am', in which Derrida (1991) locates a tendency in Levinas 
to reduce sexual differences and otherness to the height and pre-eminence 
of man as a human being, to the sameness of the wholly Other. He argues 
that Levinas's interpretation of the feminine other as dependence or the 
'initial afterwards' of Man conceives of a Work signed by the Pronoun 
He that in turn makes She secondary. 'She would then undersign the work 
from her place of derivable dependence', says one of the interlocutors 
in the dialogue, but only as the 'last or first "Hostage'" (1991: 434 ). In 
Adieu again, Derrida (1999a) recalls the same impulse to 'humanize' 
in Levinas, and argues that even though the feminine being has been 
made the condition of hospitable welcome par excellence, recollection, 
interiority of the Home and habitation, yet she lacks the height of the 
face, the absolute verticality of the Most-High. She can speak, but only a 
human language. 'There is nothing of the animal in her' because feminine 
alterity, Derrida mocks the title of one Levinas's essay and concludes, 
is 'the humanism of the other woman, of the other (as) woman' (ibid.: 
37). 
7. The word Derrida uses here for 'expel' is 'exclure' which becomes more 
pertinent here if translated as 'exclude' or 'keep out', rather than 'expel', 
which only confuses, because expelling the State (from guests?) does 
not make much sense, especially when Derrida is talking about Kant's 
condition on accessing what is elevated [s' eleve] over the surface (Derrida 
1997a: 53). 
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